

# TRIBAL SUPREME COURT PROJECT

## MEMORANDUM

APRIL 3, 2006

### UPDATE OF RECENT CASES

The Tribal Supreme Court Project is part of the Tribal Sovereignty Protection Initiative and is staffed by the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) and the Native American Rights Fund (NARF). The Project was formed in 2001 in response to a series of U.S. Supreme Court cases that negatively affected tribal sovereignty. The purpose of the Project is to promote greater coordination and to improve strategy on litigation that may affect the rights of all Indian tribes. We encourage Indian tribes and their attorneys to contact the Project in our effort to coordinate resources, develop strategy and prepare briefs, especially at the time of the petition for a writ of certiorari, prior to the Supreme Court accepting a case for review.

The Supreme Court remains in a period of transition with the confirmation of Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Associate Justice Samuel Alito. As noted in prior memorandums, Chief Justice Roberts has limited experience with federal Indian law, having represented the interests of the State of Alaska in *Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie* (scope of Indian country) and *Katie John v. United States* (subsistence fishing rights in Alaska) and representing the State of Hawaii in *Rice v. Cayetano* (status of Native Hawaiians). In contrast, Justice Alito's record reveals that he has had very little exposure to federal Indian law and minimal experience dealing with issues important to Indian country.

The Project remains very busy, monitoring numerous cases at various stages of appeal within both state and federal courts, while directly participating in the preparation of amicus briefs in the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals. You can find copies of briefs and opinions on the major cases we track on the NARF website ([www.narf.org/sct/index.html](http://www.narf.org/sct/index.html)).

### CASES RECENTLY DECIDED BY THE U.S. SUPREME COURT

**GONZALES V. O CENTRO ESPIRITA BENEFICIENTE UNIAO DO VEGETAL (NO. 04-1084)** – On February 21, 2006, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice Roberts in *Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal* (“UDV”). The UDV is a religious organization that is an outgrowth of a church in Brazil which uses a hallucinogenic tea called *hoasca* in religious ceremonies. UDV filed suit against the U.S. Attorney General under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), challenging the confiscation of its *hoasca* under the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”). The Court rejected the government's argument that need for uniform enforcement of CSA bars individual exception for the UDV's sacramental use of *hoasca* and that such an exception would compromise its ability to administer and enforce the CSA. The Court also rejected the government's argument that the CSA is a "closed system" whose ban on all uses of dangerous controlled substances does not allow individualized exceptions.

The Court points out that in fact an exception has been made to CSA – the well-established peyote exception for the Native American Church. Chief Justice Roberts notes: “If such use is permitted ... for hundreds of thousands of Native Americans practicing their faith, it is difficult to ... preclude any

consideration of a similar exception for the 130 or so American members of the UDV who want to practice theirs.” In dismissing the government’s response that there is a “unique relationship” between the U.S. and Indian tribes justifying the peyote exception, the Court states that the government failed to explain how “if any Schedule I substance is in fact *always* highly dangerous in any amount no matter how used, what about the unique relationship with the Tribes justifies allowing their use of peyote? Nothing about the unique political status of the Tribes makes their members immune from the health risks [of peyote], nor insulates [the peyote] from the alleged risk of diversion.”

The Project is concerned with the Court’s opinion which fails to recognize that Indian tribes do have a “unique relationship” with the United States government that includes special protection of Native American cultural and religious freedoms. Although not directly on point, certain language used by the Court can be used by adverse parties in their attempts to undermine the unique government-to-government relationship between individual Indian tribes and the United States, or to challenge the special political status of individual American Indians and Alaska Natives.

**WAGNON (FORMERLY RICHARDS) V. PRAIRIE BAND POTAWATOMI NATION (NO. 04-631)** – On December 6, 2005, the Supreme Court issued a very disappointing decision in *Wagon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation*. In this extremely important case for tribal taxing authority, the Tenth Circuit had held that state taxation of motor fuel is precluded where the Tribe charges a tax equal to the state tax and builds and maintains the roads on its reservation. The Tenth Circuit found that the Prairie Band is not “marketing a tax exemption” but instead the tax revenues from the gas station are “reservation generated value.”

In the majority opinion (7-2) written by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit ruling and held that because the Kansas tax is a non-discriminatory tax imposed on the off-reservation receipt of motor fuel by a non-Indian fuel distributor, the tax does not implicate tribal sovereignty and is a valid tax. Justice Thomas began his analysis by noting that “under our Indian tax immunity cases, the ‘who’ and the ‘where’ of the challenged tax have significant consequences.” The decision upheld the Kansas tax because the state law places the duty to pay the tax on the fuel distributor, a non-Indian located off-reservation, and because the tax was imposed on the distributor’s receipt of fuel off the reservation. The Court rejected the argument that it should apply the *White Mountain v. Bracker* balancing test, reasoning that this was a purely off-reservation tax that does not implicate tribal sovereignty. The Court declined to look beyond formal statutory placement of the tax at the actual consequences of dual taxation, finding this was “ultimately a complaint about the downstream consequences of the Kansas tax.” Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the tax was discriminatory because it exempted from taxation fuel delivered to other sovereigns (including States and foreign countries), concluding that Kansas provides roads services to the Nation that it does not provide to those other sovereigns.

Justice Ginsburg wrote a lengthy dissent joined by Justice Kennedy. In her view, even if the legal incidence of the tax was on the off-reservation distributor, the relevant taxable event was the sale and delivery of the fuel to the reservation. Because that sale and delivery clearly occurred on the reservation, the validity of the tax should be determined by balancing the federal, state, and tribal interests at stake. Justice Ginsburg would have struck that balance in favor of the Prairie Band because the Tribe was not marketing a tax exemption, but was instead collecting a tax to meet important transportation needs not addressed by the State. She noted that the Court’s holding was particularly troubling because it would reduce the likelihood of states and tribes resolving tax disputes through the use of state-tribal tax agreements, which she recognized as “the most beneficial means to resolve conflicts of this order.”

The impact of this decision is likely to be limited to motor fuel and tobacco taxes because these are generally the only taxes where the point of collection is shifted up the distribution chain. Many tribes and states have entered into tax agreements or other arrangements on these taxes, so the effects may not be widely felt outside Kansas. However, there is the possibility that some states will read the decision as new authority to impose taxes on reservations. We are very interested in monitoring the reaction to this case and we urge tribal leaders and attorneys to contact us if conflicts or problems should arise.

In working on this case, the Tribal Supreme Court Project worked closely with the attorneys representing the Prairie Band and attorneys from throughout Indian country, coordinating four tribal amicus briefs on behalf of NCAI, the Intertribal Transportation Alliance, the National Intertribal Tax Alliance, the other Kansas tribes, and more than 30 individual Indian tribes. The Project also worked closely with the Prairie Band in persuading the U.S. Solicitor General's Office to support the Tribe.

**WAGNON V. PRAIRIE BAND POTAWATOMI NATION (NO. 04-1740)** – On December 12, 2005, the Supreme Court issued a “GVR” in *Wagon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation* – a case involving whether federal law bars Kansas from refusing to permit the use of motor vehicle registrations and titles (tribal car tags) issued by an Indian tribe located within the State, when Kansas permits the use of registrations and titles issued by other states, foreign countries and even out-of-state Indian tribes. The Court granted cert, vacated the favorable ruling of the Tenth Circuit, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of its recent decision in *Wagon (formerly Richards) v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation*, No. 04-631 (motor fuel tax case). On remand, the case has been fully briefed in the Tenth Circuit and is scheduled for oral argument on May 9, 2006 in Denver, CO.

**CITY OF SHERRILL V. ONEIDA NATION OF NEW YORK (NO. 03-855)** - On March 28, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in *City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York*, a case that has been closely followed by many Indian tribes for its impact on tribal land claims and its application of a number of important principles of federal Indian law. In a difficult loss for Indian country, the Supreme Court ruled against the Oneida Nation, holding that while the Nation maintains a valid claim for damages for reservation lands sold in violation of the Nonintercourse Act, it may not assert tax immunity on repurchased lands within the reservation boundaries until those lands are placed into trust by the Secretary of Interior.

Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion in the 8-1 decision against the Nation, stating: “Given the longstanding distinctly non-Indian character of the area and its inhabitants, the regulatory authority constantly exercised by New York State and its counties and towns, and the Oneidas’ long delay in seeking judicial relief against parties other than the United States, we hold that the Tribe cannot unilaterally revive its ancient sovereignty, in whole or in part, over the parcels at issue. The Oneidas long ago relinquished the reins of government and cannot regain them through open-market purchases from current titleholders.”

The Court’s decision invoked the equitable doctrine of laches – that the long passage of time and the Oneida’s inaction during that time prevents the Nation from asserting its tax immunity. The Court made clear that it was not invalidating the land claim, but only one of the remedies available for the claim. The Court’s reliance on this doctrine, which was never presented or briefed by the parties, betrayed a deep lack of understanding of the legal and historical realities that prevented many tribes from being able to vindicate their rights until recent decades. While the decision should be construed as a narrow decision regarding the remedies that are available for land claims under the Nonintercourse Act, it raises concerns

that states will try to use the laches doctrine to diminish the remedies available in other tribal claims. (See discussion of *Cayuga and Seneca Cayuga v. New York* in pending cases below.)

The Court based its decision on concerns of “disruptive practical consequences.” The Court specifically noted that other tribes in New York had already sought to invalidate local zoning and land use laws to build a bingo hall “located within 300 yards of a school.” The decision shows again that the presentation of the facts and equitable issues to the Court is extremely important and often outweighs reliance on longstanding principles of law. Also important to the opinion, the Court found that Congress has provided a mechanism for reasserting tribal jurisdiction over lands through 25 U.S.C. §465, the Secretarial land-to-trust acquisition process. Essentially, this finding by the Court reaffirms the validity and purposes of the land-to-trust statute and regulations – a subject of considerable litigation in the lower courts.

### **PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI GRANTED**

Currently, no petitions for writ of certiorari have been granted in any Indian law cases.

### **PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI PENDING**

Below is a sample of petitions for a writ of certiorari which have been filed and are being monitored by the Tribal Supreme Court:

**CAYUGA AND SENECA CAYUGA V. NEW YORK (NOS. 05-982 AND 978)** – On February 3, 2006, the Cayuga Indian Nation of New York and the Seneca Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma filed a petition for cert in *Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki*, and the United States filed a separate petition for cert in *U.S. v. Pataki*, seeking review of the Second Circuit’s sweeping decision dismissing the longstanding land claims of the Cayuga Nation and Seneca Cayuga Nation against the State of New York. In the decision, the Second Circuit relied on an extremely broad reading of the Supreme Court’s decision in *City of Sherrill v. Oneida Nation* to hold that the doctrine of laches can be used to bar tribal claims that are “disruptive.” Laches is a legal concept that prevents parties from unjustified delay in asserting their rights in a way that disadvantages the adverse party. The defense of laches has not been commonly upheld against tribal claims because of the longstanding legal and practical impediments to tribal enforcement of their rights.

The Second Circuit’s ruling not only threatens to extinguish tribal land claims in the Second Circuit, but could be used by other courts to fashion a new legal doctrine that the substantive rights of Indian tribes to their lands and resources are unenforceable wherever the court finds that their recognition would seriously disrupt the *status quo*. This could affect other tribal treaty claims regarding land, water, hunting and fishing rights or related claims. The Tribal Supreme Court Project has been coordinating the preparation of three tribal amicus briefs in support of the petitions for cert: (1) the New York Tribes’ Amicus Brief which focuses on New York history and argues that the doctrine of laches cannot be invoked by a party with unclean hands and cannot be applied where legal and practical obstacles prevented the Tribes from bringing suit earlier; (2) the § 2415 Amicus Brief which focuses on the legislative history of § 2415 and argues that Congress was aware of and intended to preserve longstanding tribal claims, including tribal land claims; and (3) the NCAI Amicus Brief which addresses the "disruptive" standard, making the case that disruptiveness has no basis in Indian law and that the Second Circuit's approach will undermine the

ability of Tribes and the United States to enforce tribal rights in a variety of contexts. The amicus briefs are currently due on April 7, 2006.

**DOE V. MANN (NO. 05-815)** – On December 19, 2005, Mary Doe filed a petition for cert to seek review of the Ninth Circuit decision denying tribal exclusive jurisdiction over a child custody decision involving an Indian child within the boundaries of an Indian reservation. The Ninth Circuit held that under the Indian Child Welfare Act, tribes that fall under Public Law 280 do not have the “exclusive jurisdiction” provided by ICWA Section 1911(a). On January 27, 2006, Respondents filed their brief in opposition and filed a separate Conditional Cross-Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, asking that if the Court grants the original petition for cert, it also grant review of the Ninth Circuits ruling that ICWA provides federal courts with authority to review and invalidate final state court judgments (contrary to *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine).

**MATTAPONI INDIAN TRIBE V. VIRGINIA (05-1141)** – On March 6, 2006, the Mattaponi Indian Tribe filed a petition for cert to seek review of the Virginia Supreme Court decision which held that their treaty arises under state law, not federal law, because it was signed before the American Revolution and not created “under the authority of the United States.” Therefore, in applying state common law, the court held that the State of Virginia is immune from suit. In 1677, representatives of colonial Virginia, on behalf of the British Crown, signed a peace treaty with Indian tribes, including the Mattaponi Indian Tribe. In the litigation below, the Mattaponi asserted that the State of Virginia violated the terms of the treaty by authorizing the construction of a reservoir that would encroach on the Tribe’s lands and interfere with the Tribe’s fishing rights. The question presented to the Court is whether the obligations imposed by an Indian treaty with a prior sovereign should be enforceable as a matter of federal law under the Supremacy Clause.

**UTAH V. SHIVWITZ BAND OF PAIUTE INDIANS (05-1160)** – On March 9, 2006, the State of Utah filed its petition for cert to seek review of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decision which upheld the Secretary of the Interior’s authority to take land into trust on behalf of Indians and Indian tribes, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 465 (§ 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act), rejecting the state’s argument that § 5 is an unconstitutional delegation of the legislative power. At present, three Circuits have rejected this argument by various states. See *Carcieri v. Norton* (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. No. 03-2647); and *South Dakota v. United States Department of the Interior* (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 04-2309).

**SALINAS V. LAMEER (05-1189)** – On March 15, 2006, former members of the Temecula Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of the Pechanga Reservation (Pechanga Band) filed their petition for cert challenging the decision of the California Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the California Superior Court and held that Public Law 280 does not grant state courts jurisdiction in civil suits that implicate an Indian tribe’s sovereignty. Former members of the Pechanga Band had sought an injunction in the state court to prevent them from being disenrolled from the Tribe. At present, the brief in opposition is due April 17, 2006.

### **PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI DENIED**

**PEABODY WESTERN COAL COMPANY V. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (NO. 05-353)** – On January 23, 2006, the Court declined to review the Ninth Circuit holding that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) may involuntarily join the Navajo Nation as a defendant under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19 (joinder of necessary parties), despite EEOC’s inability to bring direct suit against the Navajo Nation pursuant to Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act. The EEOC is prosecuting a claim

against Peabody Western Coal for complying with the terms of its mining lease with the Navajo Nation. The lease requires the company to extend a preference in employment to members of the Navajo Nation. This tribal preference in employment is also a requirement under the Navajo Preference in Employment Act.

**SKOKOMISH INDIAN TRIBE V. TACOMA PUBLIC UTILITIES (NO. 05-434)** – On January 9, 2006, the Court declined to review the Ninth Circuit holding that an Indian tribe does not have a cause of action for money damages under its Treaty with the United States against a non-signatory party. In this case, the Tribe had brought a claim against a municipality alleged to have knowingly and without authorization taken nearly one-half of water flowing through the reservation, resulting in destruction of a substantial portion of the off- and on-reservation treaty-protected fisheries.

### **PENDING CASES BEFORE THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEAL AND OTHER COURTS**

**SAN MANUEL INDIAN BINGO AND CASINO V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (NO. 05-1392)** – On September 30, 2005, the National Labor Relations Board issued a decision and order finalizing its earlier May 2004 ruling that held that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) applies to tribal businesses on tribal lands. The NLRA generally exempts governmental employers from the provisions of the NLRA on collective bargaining, etc. The Board departed from longstanding precedent and created a new doctrine not found in the statute -- that tribal government “commercial” activities are subject to the NLRA, while “traditional” governmental activities are not.

The San Manuel Band of Mission Indians filed a petition for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit on October 6, 2005. The Tribe’s opening brief was filed on March 21, 2006. Under Rule 29 of the DC Circuit rules, Indian tribes and tribal organizations can only file only one amicus brief in support of the San Manuel Band. The Tribal Supreme Court Project, in close coordination with the Tribe’s attorneys and attorneys throughout Indian country, has prepared a tribal amicus brief which argues: (1) the Board’s new interpretation is inconsistent with the historical context of the NLRA and with established rules that safeguard tribal self-government; and (2) the Board’s new construction is unworkable and would, if accepted, abrogate tribal sovereignty. The tribal amicus brief is now being finalized and will be filed on April 5, 2006.

**CARCIERI V. NORTON (NO. 03-2647)** – On September 13, 2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit announced its decision in response to the State of Rhode Island’s petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc. The court had directed the parties to provide supplemental briefing on two issues: (1) whether the provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”) apply to the Narragansett Tribe (federally recognized in 1983); and (2) if additional land were taken into trust on behalf of the Narragansetts, whether the trust must be restricted to preserve Rhode Island's civil and criminal laws and jurisdiction.

The First Circuit granted the petition for rehearing and issued a new panel opinion in which the court, once again, rejected the state’s argument that the IRA does not apply to any tribe that was not “now under federal jurisdiction” in 1934. A significant number of tribes could have been hurt by the opposite ruling. Second, the court, once again, rejected the broad arguments that Section 5 is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority and that taking land into trust diminishes state sovereignty in violation

of the Tenth Amendment, the Enclave Clause, and the Admissions Clause, and exceeds the authority of Congress under the Indian Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

The Tribal Supreme Court Project coordinated the writing of amicus briefs in the case with the attorneys for the Narragansett Indian Tribe and the United States throughout the appeals process. NCAI was represented pro bono by Ian Gershengorn and Sam Hirsh of Jenner & Block and Riyaz Kanji of Kanji & Katzen. This case is an important victory for Indian tribes because of the significance of the IRA and the Secretary's land-to-trust authority. Once again, we anticipate an appeal by the State of Rhode Island.

**NARRAGANSETT TRIBE V. RHODE ISLAND (NO. 04-1155)** – On May 12, 2005, the 1<sup>st</sup> Circuit issued its decision on the Narragansett Tribe's request for relief from the State's violent efforts to close down a tribal smoke shop – forcibly serving a search warrant, seizing unstamped cigarettes, and arresting tribal officials. Narragansett is subject to a unique federal statute that gives full civil and criminal jurisdiction to the State. The 1<sup>st</sup> Circuit held that the Narragansett Tribe is obligated to comply with the State's cigarette tax laws as they apply to non-Indian consumers. However, the State exceeded its authority in imposing a warrant on the Narragansett tribal government because the Tribe retains its sovereign immunity and the State had less intrusive means available to enforce its laws. On June 6, 2005, the State of Rhode Island filed a petition for rehearing en banc.

On July 14, 2005, the First Circuit issued an order granting the state's petition for rehearing en banc on the questions of whether, to what extent, and in what manner the state may enforce its civil and criminal laws with respect to the operation of the tribal smokeshop. The order vacated the May 12, 2005 judgment and directed the parties to submit supplemental briefs on the enforcement questions, "including the effect (if any) of tribal sovereign immunity." The Project has been working with the attorneys representing the Tribe, and NCAI submitted an amicus brief in support of the Tribe which was prepared pro bono by the Nordhaus Law Firm. The First Circuit heard oral arguments on December 6, 2005, and during oral arguments invited the parties to submit supplemental briefing regarding the Supreme Court's opinion in *Wagon (formerly Richards) v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation* handed down earlier that day.

**MEANS V. NAVAJO NATION (NO. 01-17489)** – In *U.S. v. Lara*, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, holding that the Duro amendment is an affirmation of tribal inherent authority. However, the *Lara* Court expressly declined to answer the question of whether the tribal criminal prosecution of a nonmember Indian would violate the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

On August 28, 2005, the Ninth Circuit issued its decision holding that under the 1990 amendments to the Indian Civil Rights Act (the *Duro* amendments), the Navajo Nation may exercise misdemeanor criminal jurisdiction over a person who is not a member of the tribe, but who is an enrolled member of another Indian tribe. First, relying on *Morton v. Mancari*, the court concluded that "the weight of established law requires us to reject Means's equal protection claim" on the basis that Indian tribal identity is political rather than racial. Second, the court found that Means's "facial due process challenge has no force" in light of the fact that the Indian Civil Rights Act confers all the protections Means would receive under the U.S. Constitution except the right to grand jury indictment (which is not available in a misdemeanor prosecution) and the right to appointed counsel (which is provided in the Navajo Bill of Rights). On October 12, 2005, Means filed a petition for rehearing and/or rehearing en banc. On December 12, 2005, without additional briefing or argument, the Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion affirming its earlier opinion.

In a related case, *Morris v. Tanner*, the Ninth Circuit issued an unpublished memorandum opinion affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Tribe, simply relying on the holding of *Means*. The issue of tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians is of critical importance to Indian country. We anticipate that both *Means* and *Morris* will seek review by the Supreme Court.

**SMITH V. SALISH KOOTENAI COLLEGE (NO. 03-35306)** – On January 10, 2006, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit issued its decision holding that the tribal court has civil jurisdiction over a tort action that arose as a result of a traffic accident on a public highway within the Reservation which involved a non-member Indian who was a student at the tribal college and who was driving the vehicle as part of a vocational program at the college. The en banc opinion reversed the three-judge panel opinion. The Tribal Supreme Court Project prepared and filed an amicus brief in support of the petition for rehearing en banc, supporting the college and the Tribe's position.

**FORD MOTOR CO. V. TODECHEENE (NO. 02-17048)** – On January 11, 2005, the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in a case involving the scope of tribal civil jurisdiction over a products liability action arising out of an accident on the Navajo Reservation on a road wholly owned by the Nation. The Todecheene family filed a wrongful death action in Navajo tribal court, and Ford filed a complaint in U.S. District Court challenging the Navajo court's jurisdiction. In an expansion of *Strate v. A-1 Contractors*, the 9<sup>th</sup> Circuit ruled that the Montana analysis applies even when on Indian land and ruled against tribal jurisdiction. On February 10, 2005, the Navajo Nation, in coordination with the Tribal Supreme Court Project, filed a petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc. On February 15, 2005, the court issued an order directing Ford Motor Company to file a response to the petition for rehearing. The case has been fully briefed and awaits a decision from the Ninth Circuit on the petition for rehearing.

### **CONTRIBUTIONS TO SUPREME COURT PROJECT**

As always, NCAI and NARF welcome general contributions to the Tribal Supreme Court Project. Please send any general contributions to NCAI, attn: Sharon Ivy, 1301 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20036.

**Please contact us if you have any questions or if we can be of assistance: John Dossett, NCAI General Counsel, 503-248-0783 ([jdossett@ncai.org](mailto:jdossett@ncai.org)) or Richard Guest, NARF Senior Staff Attorney, 202-785-4166 ([richardg@narf.org](mailto:richardg@narf.org)).**